Quasi-option value under strategic interactions by Fujii Tomoki et al.
Quasi-option value under strategic
interactions
著者 Fujii Tomoki, Ishikawa Ryuichiro
journal or
publication title
Resource and energy economics
volume 34
number 1
page range 36-54
year 2012-01
権利 (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V.　　NOTICE: this is the
author’s version of a work that was accepted
for publication in Resource and energy
economics. Changes resulting from the
publishing process, such as peer review,
editing, corrections, structural formatting,
and other quality control mechanisms may not
be reflected in this document. Changes may
have been made to this work since it was
submitted for publication. A definitive
version was subsequently published in
PUBLICATION, VOL34, ISSUE1, 2012
DOI:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2011.09.002
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/115461
doi: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2011.09.002
Quasi-option Value under Strategic Interactions
Tomoki Fujiia and Ryuichiro Ishikawab
aSchool of Economics, Singapore Management University,
90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903
e-mail: tfujii@smu.edu.sg
bFaculty of Engineering, Information and Systems,
University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Ten-nodai, Tsukuba 305-8573, Japan
e-mail: ishikawa@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp
Published in
Resource and Energy Economics, 34(1): pp. 36{54, 2012.
1
Abstract
We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions
between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some con-
ceptual diculties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail
to induce rst-best allocations. Therefore a regulator may not be able to exercise the option to
delay the decision to develop. We also show that information-induced ineciency may arise in
a game situation and that under certain assumptions ineciency can be eliminated by sending
asymmetric information to the players, even when the regulator faces informational constraints.
Our model is potentially applicable to various global environmental problems.
Keywords: Biodiversity, Irreversibility, Quasi-option value, Uncertainty, Value of information.
JEL classication codes: C72, H43, Q50.
Published in Resource and Energy Economics
1. Introduction
Irreversibility is one of the most fundamental characteristics of the environmental problems
we currently face. Extinction of an endangered species is one obvious example. Because we
cannot restore a species that has become extinct, the action that entails a loss of species can
be considered irreversible.1 When there is uncertainty about future states, the impacts of
irreversible actions must be carefully evaluated. For example, if a project drives an economically
valuable but yet-to-be-discovered species to extinction, opportunity cost arises due to the loss
of that species. However, such cost is typically ignored in project evaluation because of the lack
of information about the species at the time of evaluation.
One can appropriately account for the potential loss of species by taking into consideration
the quasi-option value (QOV), or the Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry option value due to Arrow
and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Fisher and Hanemann (1987), and Hanemann (1989). The
quasi-option value can be viewed as the value associated with the mere prospect of obtaining
better information in the future. This concept is related to the (unconditional) expected value
of information (EVI) but is generally dierent from it (Conrad, 1980; Hanemann, 1989). Fisher
(2000) argued that QOV is also equivalent to the option value for investment under uncertainty
proposed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), though Mensink and Requate (2005) showed that they
dier by the postponement value irrespective of uncertainty.
Previous studies of the QOV have generally assumed the presence of a single decision-maker.
Given that strategic interactions are almost always absent in a standard cost-benet analysis,
this is a reasonable starting point. Yet, many of the situations to which the concept of the QOV
is relevant involve strategic interactions among relevant players.
For example, consider an open-access forest that potentially contains undiscovered genetic
resources, the existence of which may only become known in the future as a result of scien-
tic research. Because there is open access to the forest, each logger may nd the immediate
benets from logging more attractive than conservation of the forest's genetic resources, even
if conservation is a better option for the society at large; this results in a \prisoners' dilemma"
situation.
It is important to take strategic interactions into account when conducting the cost-benet
analysis because it may alter the conclusion. For example, in the case of a single decision-maker,
the information that becomes available in the future never hurt the decision-maker. However, in
the presence of strategic interactions, a prisoners' dilemma situation can be induced by public
information.
To see this, consider a case when there is a follower advantage (and a leader disadvantage) in
development.2 In this case, the prospect of future information gives players a strong incentive to
hold back development because future information helps the players to make an informed decision
and because the players can avoid the leader disadvantage by holding back development. As a
result, both players may choose to conserve the forest, even if it is socially ecient to develop
the forest now. As shown below, an ecient outcome can be achieved in this case by giving
information asymmetrically. That is, the perfect information about the true state is given to
one player and a noisy message is given to the other player.
This nding has important implications for policies. It is widely believed that making ad-
ditional information to the public is generally desirable. Therefore, we often tend to hold the
opinion that new information and knowledge accumulated by the public sector, for example
through publicly-funded research activities, should be made widely available. However, our re-
sults warns against mindless public disclosure of information. It may be better to keep some
1In this paper, we say that an action is irreversible when it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to undo
the action.
2A more precise denition of this is given later.
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players more informed than others. Based on this, public information disclosure must be ac-
companied by careful consideration of the possibility of information-induced ineciency.
This argument creates obvious and immediate concerns regarding equity issues. It may be
dicult to justify informing one player but not the other. However, even in cases of this type, we
can ensure equity ex ante by randomly assigning the player who receives the perfect information
before current actions are taken. Incorporating this twist into our model would not change our
results in any signicant manner.
Beside contributing to the existing literature on the QOV mentioned above, this study also
contributes to the body of literature on value of information. Our denition of the value of
information is dierent from the denitions used in previous studies such as Levine and Ponssard
(1977), Bassan et al. (2003), and Kamien et al. (1990). For example, Kamien et al. (1990)
essentially dene the value of information as the maximum transfer that an external agent
(maven) can extract from the players of the game. In contrast, our denition is based on the
expected social gains that information brings about.
This paper has two purposes. The rst is to highlight some conceptual diculties with the
QOV under strategic interactions. As will be shown later, it is possible to dene generalized
version of EVI in the presence of strategic interaction. However, the same cannot said about
the QOV because the option to delay decisions to exploit future information may not exist.
For example, when the best response to conserve the forest is to develop the forest today,
conservation will not be supported as an equilibrium.
The second purpose of the paper is to investigate the potential importance of information-
induced ineciency. We demonstrate that all the players could be hurt if they know that they will
know more in the future. In cases where this applies, the regulator should carefully disseminate
information. In particular, we show that sending information about the state asymmetrically
across players may be useful for achieving a socially ecient outcome.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce strategic interactions into
the standard framework of the QOV. We then discuss the conceptual diculty with the QOV
under strategic interactions. In Section 3, we consider a case in which information is given
to the players asymmetrically to achieve an ecient outcome. It is shown in this section that
manipulating information about the state by providing noisy message about the state may be
socially desirable. Section 4 provides some discussions.
2. Setup
Building upon the existing literature on QOV, we set up a model of irreversible investment
that includes the possibility of strategic interactions among players. Whenever possible, we use
notations similar to Hanemann (1989).
Following the previous literature, we assume that there are two time periods, of which
period 1 is the current period and period 2 is the future period. Previous studies typically
assumed, often implicitly, that there is a single decision-maker who can choose the action to be
taken in each period. We regard this decision-maker as a social planner in this study.
In line with the standard model, we consider the following situation: a forest can be developed
in each period. The forest may contain biological resources that will be lost if the forest is
developed (clear-cut). A key assumption in the previous QOV literature and in this study is
that development is irreversible; forest that has been developed in period 1 cannot be reversed
to the original state in period 2 (i.e., the lost biological resources cannot be recovered).
We shall denote by S  fs1; s2g the set of all possible states; s1 represents the state in
which there are no biological resources, and s2 is the state in which biological resources exist.
Hence, opportunity cost due to the loss of biological resources arises only when the state is s2.
In period 1, the state is not known. However, it is known ex ante that s1 and s2 occur with
probability  and 1    respectively. In period 2, the state may be known before an action is
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taken because of, for example, (exogenous) scientic research. To keep the model simple, we
shall only consider independent learning. That is, the state is revealed in period 2 regardless of
the actions taken in period 1.
An important dierence between this study and previous QOV studies is that we incorporate
strategic interactions. We assume that the society has two risk-neutral players,  and , and a
risk-neutral regulator. The value of  is common knowledge. The two players in this setup may
be thought of as forest loggers or private land developers. We shall discuss various outcomes
that depends on the degree of control the regulator has over the players.
In each period t 2 f1; 2g, each player i 2 f; g chooses an action, dit 2 f0; 1g, where dit = 0
represents conservation and dit = 1 represents development. We assume that conservation is
always chosen when the decision-maker is indierent between conservation and development.
Because the action to develop is irreversible, we must have di1  di2. Notice that modeling
the choice between conservation and development as a discrete choice is not as restrictive as it
may appear because a corner solution almost always arises when there is a constant returns to
scale technology of development, as shown by Arrow and Fisher (1974). Hence, our analysis can
readily be extended to a case of continuous development on a unit interval. In this study, we
use a discrete-choice model to avoid unnecessary complications.
In what follows, players may be allowed to take an action in period 2 after they have learned
the state. In such a case, the action in period 2 is state-dependent. Therefore, we shall write
di2(s) when we need to make clear that the action is state-dependent. With a slight abuse of
notation, we denote the action prole at time t by dt  (dt ; dt ), the sequence of actions taken
by player i by di  (di1; di2), and the sequence of the action prole by d  (d1; d2).
Let Ai1 = f0; 1g and Ai2(di1)  f1g[fdi1g represent the set of permissible actions for player i in
periods 1 and 2, respectively. Note that Ai2 depends on d
i
1 because conservation cannot be chosen
in period 2 if the player has already chosen development in period 1. We let A1  A1A1 be the
set of permissible action proles in period 1 and dene the set A of the sequence of permissible
action proles by the following:
A 
n
(d1 ; d

1 ); (d

2 ; d

2 )

jd1  d2 ; d1  d2 , and d1 ; d1 ; d2 ; d2 2 f0; 1g
o
: (1)
We also assume that the forest is subject to open access. When at least one player chooses to
develop, the biological resources in the forest will be lost. We also assume that the total payo
from development (i.e., the sum of payos for the two players) depends only on the timing of
development and not on who develops. Therefore, who develops only aects the distribution of
individual payos for the two players.
We make the following assumptions about the distribution of the payos from development:
When both players choose to develop at the same time, they share the payos from development
equally. If one player chooses to develop in period 1 and the other in period 2, then the leader
in development (i.e., the player who develops in periods 1 and 2) takes all of the per-period
payo from development in period 1 and a share k 2 (0; 1) in period 2. The follower (i.e., the
player who develops only in period 2) receives no payo in period 1 and a share 1   k of the
payo from development in period 2. We assume that the value of k is common knowledge. The
interpretation of the parameter k will be presented subsequently.
We normalize the payos so that the per-period payo from conservation is equal to zero.
Further, we assume that the total payo from development to the society in period 1 is positive.
If not, it is always best for the society to wait until period 2 to develop and the problem is not
interesting. For a similar reason, we assume the per-period payo from development in period 2
is negative in one state and positive in the other. Given these assumptions, we can permit the
total per-period payo from development to the society be equal to a in period 1, b in period 2
if the state is s1, and  c in period 2 if the state is s2, where a, b, and c are positive constants
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Table 1: The per-period payo matrix (v1 (d1); v

1 (d1)) in period 1.
d1 = 0 d

1 = 1
d1 = 0 (0; 0) (0; a)
d1 = 1 (a; 0) (
a
2 ;
a
2 )
Table 2: The per-period payo matrix (v2 (d; s); v

2 (d; s)) in period 2 when s = s1 (top) and s = s2 (bottom).
s = s1 d
 = (0; 0) d = (0; 1) d = (1; 1)
d = (0; 0) (0; 0) (0; b) (0; b)
d = (0; 1) (b; 0) (12b;
1
2b) ((1  k)b; kb)
d = (1; 1) (b; 0) (kb; (1  k)b) (12b; 12b)
s = s2 d
 = (0; 0) d = (0; 1) d = (1; 1)
d = (0; 0) (0, 0) (0; c) (0; c)
d = (0; 1) ( c; 0) ( 12c; 12c) ( (1  k)c; kc)
d = (1; 1) ( c; 0) ( kc; (1  k)c) ( 12c; 12c)
expressed in present value. In this section, the values of a, b, and c are common knowledge. In
the next section, however, they are known only to the players, but not necessarily to a regulator.
We denote player i's per-period payo in periods 1 and 2 by vi1 : A1 ! R and vi2 : AS ! R,
respectively. Note here that the payo in period 2 is state-dependent. We present vi1(d1) and
vi2(d; s) in the form of payo matrices in Tables 1 and 2.
The rows and columns of each matrix represent, respectively, player 's and player 's
strategies (action or sequence of actions). The rst entry in each parenthesis represents player
's per-period payo, and the second entry represents player 's per-period payo. Note that,
regardless of who chooses to develop, the total payo always sums to a in period 1 when de-
velopment takes place in that period. Similarly, the total payo from development in period 2
is b when s = s1 and  c when s = s2, respectively. An important parameter in Table 2 is k.
When k > 1=2, the leader takes a larger share of the total payo from development than the
follower, and the opposite is true when k < 1=2. Therefore, k can be considered a measure of
leader advantage in getting a larger share of the total payo than the follower.
There is no reason a priori to assume that k is larger than, equal to, or smaller than 1=2.
It would be possible for the leader in development to retain a large share of forest in period 2,
because he already has a footing in the forest. However, it would also be possible for the follower
to obtain a larger share of the forest if the institution is designed to favor the follower in period 2
to ensure dynamic equality with regard to the use of open-access resources.
It should also be noted that the share k is xed regardless of the state in this model. There
are two reasons for this choice. First, by xing k, the responsibility for the (potential) loss of
biological resources is proportionate to the (potential) gain from development. In this way, we
can shut o the externality due to the loss of biological resources. Second, by xing k, we can
keep the number of model parameters small.
Having said this, however, it is plausible that in practice the benets and costs of development
may be shared dierently by the players. When biological resources are lost, everyone in the
society may be hurt. On the other hand, logging would only benet the loggers. Therefore,
depending on the situation, it may be appropriate to let k depend on the state.
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that the regulator is able to transfer the payos
between the players in a lump-sum manner. Therefore, the social welfare function that the
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regulator tries to maximize is simply the expected total payo in the society (i.e., the sum of
the payos for players  and ) for the two periods.
We shall consider the following three cases in which the regulator r has dierent degrees of
control over the actions of the players and sends dierent type of information about the true
state:
(I) The regulator is a social planner who can stipulate the actions taken by each player. This
is the rst-best case and is equivalent to a single decision-maker case.
(II) The regulator is merely an informant. He simply tells the players the true state in period 2
before their actions are taken; he has no control over the actions taken by each player.
This case is used to introduce the EVI for the society.
(III) The regulator has no control over the actions taken by each player and also has no knowl-
edge of the values of a, b, and c, except that they satisfy a certain condition. He can,
however, send a (potentially noisy) message about the state to each player to achieve an
ecient outcome. The regulator may vary the message across players.
In each of these cases, the regulator learns the state in period 2 and may pass to the players
some information about the true state.
In the next subsections, we shall discuss the QOV as well as a related concept of the EVI for
Cases (I) and (II). Comparison of these cases allows us to see the importance of strategic inter-
actions in the model of irreversible investment. It also permits us to highlight some conceptual
diculties with the QOV under conditions where strategic interactions occur.
We shall delay the discussion of Case (III) until the next section, in which we discuss the
possibility of sending messages about the state to the players in an asymmetric manner to achieve
an ecient outcome. We will demonstrate that the EVI for the society depends critically on
how the information is disseminated. For example, making better information available to
everyone hurts everyone when the prospect of better information induces a prisoner's dilemma
situation. In such cases, social welfare may be improved by providing information to the public
asymmetrically so that one player gets better information than the other. Therefore, Case (III)
points to the possibility that the government may be able to improve eciency by manipulating
the information given to the players.
2.1. Case (I): Social Planner
In Case (I), we shall consider a social planner, who can stipulate the actions taken by the
players. Because the social planner is the sole decision-maker in this case, Case (I) is equivalent
to the standard single-person setup. Therefore, the denitions of the QOV and EVI in Case (I)
are also equivalent to the standard denitions. Note that the parameter k is not relevant in this
case because this parameter aects only the distribution and not the expected total payo.
Let drt  dt + dt   dt dt ; this expression takes a value of zero if both players choose to
conserve in period t 2 f1; 2g and a value of one otherwise. From the social planner's perspective,
drt provides sucient statistics, because the expected total payo depends only on whether and
when development takes place, and not on who chooses to develop. Using drt , we can also dene
the per-period payo for the social planner as follows:
vr1(d
r
1) = v

1 (d1) + v

1 (d1) = ad
r
1 (2)
vr2(d
r
2; s) = v

2 (d; s) + v

2 (d; s) = (b  Ind(s = s1)  c  Ind(s = s2)) dr2; (3)
where Ind() is an indicator function that takes a value of one if the statement inside the
parentheses is true and zero otherwise and where di1  di2 is satised for i 2 f; ; rg.
To dene the QOV and EVI, we need to consider two scenarios. In the rst, no information
about the state is available to the players or the social planner in period 2. Hence, all decisions
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can be made in period 1, and these decisions correspond to the open-loop strategy. In this
scenario, the objective function that the social planner wishes to maximize in period 1 is the
following:
V (dr1)  vr1(dr1) + max
dr2(dr1)
Es[v
r
2(d
r
2; s)] (4)
= vr1(d
r
1) + max
dr2(dr1)
fB   C; 0g; (5)
where B  b, C  (1   )c, and Es[] is an expectation operator taken over all the possible
states. We use an asterisk () to emphasize that the decisions are made in the absence of
information in period 2. B and C may be interpreted as the expected payo for period 2,
decomposed into the s1- and s2-components.
The social planner chooses dr1 in period 1 to maximize V (). Because V (0) = maxfB C; 0g
and V (1) = (a+B   C), we have:
W I  max
dr1
V (dr1) (6)
= V (dr1 ) (7)
=

V (1) = a+B   C if C < a+B
V (0) = 0 if C  a+B; (8)
with dr1 = Ind(C < a+B).
In the second scenario, information about the state becomes available before actions are
taken in period 2 but after actions are taken in period 1. In general, information about the
state may consist of a message that contains some information about the state. However, in this
section, we consider only the simplest case, in which the information is perfect (i.e., the players
and the social planner learn the true state in period 2). Therefore, in the second scenario, the
players are allowed to take state-contingent actions in period 2, and the strategy in this scenario
corresponds to the closed-loop strategy. The objective function in this scenario can be written
as follows:
V^ (dr1)  vr1(dr1) +Es

max
dr2(s)
vr2(d
r
2(s); s)

(9)
= vr1(d
r
1) + (B   C)dr1 +B(1  dr1) (10)
= (a  C)dr1 +B: (11)
We use the hat (^) notation to emphasize that the decisions are made in the presence of infor-
mation in period 2. The social planner chooses d^r1 to maximize V^ (). Because V^ (0) = B and
V^ (1) = a+B   C, we have:
W^I  max
dr1
V^ (dr1) (12)
= V^ (d^r1) (13)
=

V^ (1) = a+B   C if C < a
V^ (0) = B if C  a; (14)
with d^r1 = Ind(C < a).
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Following Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Fisher and Hanemann (1987), and Hane-
mann (1989), the QOV in Case (I) is the dierence in the expected net present value of devel-
opment relative to conservation between the two scenarios. That is:
QOVI  (V^ (0)  V^ (1))  (V (0)  V (1)) = min(B;C): (15)
The QOV can be interpreted in the following way. Suppose we evaluate the conservation
(relative to development) in period 1 while ignoring the prospect of new information in period 2.
The net present value of conservation is then V (0)   V (1). However, this is not a correct
calculation. To obtain the correct net present value of conservation (i.e., V^ (0)  V^ (1)), we need
to add an adjustment term. This adjustment term is the QOV.
In this model, the information in period 2 is valueless when development starts in period 1
because the decision to develop is irreversible. This point is reected in the fact that V (1) =
V^ (1). Using this relationship, we can rewrite Eq.(15) as QOVI = V^ (0)   V (0). Therefore, as
Hanemann (1989) has shown, QOV can be interpreted as the value of information conditional
on conservation in period 1.
The EVI should be dened as the expected gains in the objective function from the in-
formation that becomes available in period 2. Following Hanemann (1989), we dene EVI as
follows:
EVI  W^I  W I =
8<:
0 if C < a
 a+ C if a  C < a+B
B if a+B  C.
(16)
The denitions of QOV and EVI in Case (I) are equivalent to the standard denitions. Therefore,
Case (I) serves as a benchmark case for this study and is used as a basis for comparison with
the two cases presented below.
2.2. Case (II): Social EVI resulting from decentralized decision making
Case (II) is the same as Case (I) except that in Case (II) the regulator has no control over
the players' actions. In other words, the players can freely choose their actions. The regulator
in Case (II) simply informs the players of the state in period 2 before their actions are taken.
A major dierence between Case (I) and Case (II) is that in Case (II), each player has to take
into account the direct consequences of his own action (i.e., if he chooses to develop in period 1,
then he must choose to develop in period 2 as well) as well as his opponent's response to his
action. In our model, player i assumes that his opponent  i  f; gnfig always plays the best
response to his action in each period, and this is common knowledge. We also assume that the
players know exactly whether and how the information is transmitted from the regulator; this
assumption is maintained for the rest of this paper.
Because, given the action prole d1 = (d

1 ; d

1 )(2 A1) in period 1, each player freely chooses
his own action, a Nash equilibrium is played in period 2. With this equilibrium, we can go back
to period 1, and nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. By comparing the equilibrium
outcome that occurs with and without the prospect of information in period 2, we can consider
the QOV and EVI for Case (II). As we argue below, it turns out to be dicult to dene the
QOV in the presence of strategic interactions. However, by comparing the EVI for Case (I) and
Case (II), we can see the impacts of strategic interactions.
Note that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique. Because equilibrium selection is not the
focus of this paper, we simply assume that an equilibrium that is ecient under the potential
compensation criterion (i.e., the equilibrium that has the highest expected total payo) will be
chosen. Even with this restriction, the possibility of multiple equilibria remains. However, once
this restriction is imposed, the multiplicity of equilibria is irrelevant for our purpose because
the total equilibrium payo is unique. Further, as described in the Appendix, we have a unique
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equilibrium for most combinations of parameters. Therefore, even if we drop the assumption
of ecient equilibrium, the main ndings of our study will hold. We shall briey consider the
consequences of relaxing this assumption in the Appendix.
Let us now formally consider the QOV and EVI under strategic interactions with some
additional notations. As with the previous subsection, we need to consider two scenarios. In
the rst, the information is not available to the players in period 2. Therefore, the players are
not allowed to take state-contingent actions in period 2.
To solve the game using backward induction, we rst dene the best response BRi2 in
period 2 for player i(2 f; g) as a function of the action prole d1 in period 1 and of the
opponent's action d i2 (2 A i2 (d i1 )) in period 2, as follows:
BRi2 (d
 i
2 ; d1) 2 arg max
di22Ai2(di1)
Es[v
i
2((d1; (d

2 ; d

2 )); s)]: (17)
Given d1, the Nash equilibrium in period 2 can be described as a pair d

2 that satises the
following:
d2(d1) 

d2 (d1); d

2 (d1)

=

BR2 (d

2 ; d1); BR

2 (d

2 ; d1)

: (18)
Using the Nash equilibrium action prole d2(d1) in period 2, the best response BRi1 for
player i in period 1 can be dened as follows:
BRi1 (d
 i
1 ) 2 arg max
di12Ai1
n
vi1(d1) +Es[v
i
2((d1; d

2(d1)); s)]
o
: (19)
Hence, the action prole d1 in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium satises the expression:
d1 =

d1 ; d

1

=

BR1 (d

1 ); BR

1 (d

1 )

: (20)
The sequence of the equilibrium action prole is given by d  (d1; d2(d1)).
Let us now illustrate the solution procedure described above. The top panel of Table 3
provides the expected payo prole for all the possible action proles. The bold rules dene the
four subgames determined by each of the four action proles d1 2 f(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 0); (1; 1)g.
For example, when the action prole in period 1 is d1 = (0; 0), the cells a
), b), d), and e)
belong to the same subgame. The cell i), on the other hand, is a subgame in itself. Therefore,
given d1 = (1; 1), this cell is trivially an equilibrium in period 2
Let us now describe how backward induction works in our model when C > a + B. The
lightly shaded cells in the top panel of Table 3 provide the equilibrium in each subgame. Going
back to period 1, we have the bottom panel of Table 3. When C > a+ B, both players choose
di1 = 0, so that the sequence of the action prole in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
is ((0; 0); (0; 0)). Hereafter, we shall use the payo matrix to describe the equilibrium. For
example, when C > a+B, the equilibrium is given by the cell a) in the top panel of Table 3.
One might argue that the analysis could be simplied by taking the Nash equilibrium in the
top panel instead of considering the equilibrium in each subgame. It turns out that doing so
makes no dierence for the analysis in this subsection. However, in general, the players cannot
commit to the action taken in period 2, and this point is relevant in the next section. Therefore,
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a more appropriate solution concept in our model.
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Table 4: The ex ante payo matrix when the players learn the true state in period 2 before they take actions
d1 0 1
d1
PPPPPPPd

2 (s)
d2 (s) Ind(s = s1) 1
0 Ind(s = s1) a^) (B=2; B=2) b^) ((1  k)B; a+ kB   C)
1 1 c^) (a+ kB   C; (1  k)B) d^) ((a+B   C)=2; (a+B   C)=2)
Let us now consider the second scenario, in which the uncertainty about the state is resolved
after players have taken actions in period 1 but before actions are taken in period 2. Because
both players know the state before they take their actions in period 2, each player i is able to
take his actions di2(s) contingent on the state s(2 S) in this scenario. To obtain the equilibrium
action prole, we need to dene the best response dBRi2 of player i in period 2 as a function of
the action prole d1(2 A1) in period 1, the opponent's action d i2 (s)(2 A i2 ), and the state s as
follows:
dBRi2(d i2 (s); d1; s) 2 arg max
di2(s)2Ai2(di1)
n
vi2((d1; (d

2 (s); d

2 (s))); s)
o
for i 2 f; g: (21)
With this denition and given d1(2 A1), the Nash equilibrium action prole in period 2 can
be described as a pair of best response actions d^2(d1; s)(2 A2(d1)) in the following manner:
d^2(d1; s)  (d^2 (s; d1); d^2 (s; d1)) =
dBR2 (d^2 (s; d1); d1; s);dBR2 (d^2 (s; d1); d1; s) : (22)
We can now go back to period 1 and dene the best response in period 1 as a function of
the opponent's action as follows:
dBRi1(d i1 ) 2 arg max
di12Ai1
n
vi1(d1) +Es[v
i
2((d1; d^2(d1; s)); s)]
o
for i 2 f; g: (23)
Given this, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium action prole in period 1 is d^1:
d^1 = (d^

1 ; d^

1 ) =
dBR1 (d^1 );dBR1 (d^1 ) (24)
Thus, the sequence of the equilibrium action prole in the presence of information in period 2
is given by d^(s)  (d^1; d^2(d^1; s)).
When the players can take state-contingent actions, they always choose to develop if the state
is s1 and never choose to develop if the state is s2 regardless of the parameter values. Therefore,
(di2(s1); d
i
2(s2)) = (1; 0) dominates (0; 0), (0; 1), and (1; 1). After eliminating the dominated
strategies, we can write the ex ante payo matrix, as shown in Table 4. As the table shows,
there is only one cell in each of the four subgames in period 2. As a result, the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium is identical to the Nash equilibrium for a one-shot game with the same payo
matrix.
Let us now revisit the concepts of the QOV and EVI. The standard QOV measures the
dierence in the payo of conservation relative to development between the two scenarios with
and without information about the state in period 2. Therefore, if V^ (0), V^ (1), V (0), and V (1)
for the society could somehow be dened (hereafter, we denote these with the subscript S), then
12
the social QOV could be dened as QOVS  (V^S(0)  V^S(1))  (V S (0)  V S (1)).
However, the problem is that it is dicult to meaningfully dene V^S(0) and so on. Ideally,
V^S(0) should be dened as the total payo when conservation takes place in period 1. However,
if the regulator is unable to stipulate the players' actions and if conservation in period 1 is not
supported as an equilibrium, then the regulator does not really have an option to delay devel-
opment decision until period 2. Therefore, without additional restrictions on the equilibrium, it
would not be possible to meaningfully dene the social QOV.
Unlike the social QOV, it is possible to meaningfully dene the EVI for the society in the
presence of strategic interactions. The idea is simple; we take the change in the expected total
payo in the equilibrium due to the information that becomes available in period 2. Formally,
we can dene the social EVI (EVIS) as follows:
Denition 1 Let W^II  Es
h
v1 (d^1) + v

1 (d^1) + v

2 (d^(s); s) + v

2 (d^(s); s)
i
be the expected
total payo with information about the true state in period 2. Similarly, we let W II 
Es
h
v1 (d

1) + v

1 (d

1) + v

2 (d
; s) + v2 (d
; s)
i
be the expected total payo without information
about the true state in period 2. We dene the social EVI under strategic interactions as
follows:
EVIS  W^II  W II : (25)
The social EVI is not uniquely dened if there are multiple equilibria. Therefore, as discussed
earlier, we shall take the most ecient equilibrium. With this restriction, the full description of
EVIS is given in the Appendix.
One important point to notice from Denition 1 is that the social EVI may or may not
be positive. Remember that the players are informed of the true state in period 2 before the
actions are taken. Therefore, if the social EVI is negative, making more information available
to everyone decreases the eciency. For the payo structure described in Tables 1 and 2, it is
possible to show the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The social EVI is negative if and only if
k <
1
2
; C < a; and
2(a  C)
1  2k < B < C +
2a
1  2k (26)
A complete description of EVIS for all possible combination of parameters is provided in the
Appendix, and it also serves as an informal proof of this proposition. We shall discuss below
why the prospect of additional information is possibly harmful to everyone.
When k < 1=2, we have a situation where a larger share of the benets (and costs) will be
obtained if the player is a follower in development. Therefore, if B > C, each player has the
incentive to hold back development until period 2 so that he does not have to suer from the
leader disadvantage. Obviously, this point must be weighed against the opportunity cost (a) of
conservation in period 1.
When C < a holds, it is ecient for the society to develop in period 1 because the opportunity
cost of conservation in period 1 is large relative to the potential gains from information (C is
the expected loss that could be avoided by utilizing the information in period 2). This ecient
outcome is achieved in the absence of information in period 2 if development is suciently
attractive but B is not large enough for the players to try to be followers in development. This
occurs when 0 < B < C +2a=(1  2k). Therefore, the upper bound on B in Eq.(26) reects the
condition for the ecient outcome in the absence of information.
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Now consider the scenario in which the players learn the state in period 2. In this scenario,
the players have more to lose by choosing development in period 1. Because the opponent
can take state-contingent actions in period 2, players suer from a larger cost when the state
is s = s2, whereas they enjoy a smaller fraction of benet when the state is s = s1, because
k < 1=2. Therefore, the prospect of future information gives each player an additional incentive
to conserve in period 1. The lower bound on B ensures that both players choose to conserve in
period 1 in this scenario. As a result, when Eq.(26) holds, conservation takes place in period 1
even if it is not socially ecient to conserve.
In short, the situation described in Eq.(26) shows that the prospect of future information
induces a prisoner's dilemma situation. There are other situations in our model where such a
situation arises in the presence of information (2 and 6 in Figure A.2 and Table A.7 in the
Appendix), but the situation described in Proposition 1 is unique in the sense that the prisoner's
dilemma is induced by the prospect of better information.
This point begs another question. Would it be possible for the regulator to manipulate the
information given to the players in such a way as to improve the eciency (by avoiding the
prisoner's dilemma situation)? It is clear from Proposition 1 that the regulator can improve
eciency by not passing information to players when Eq.(26) holds (the regulator announces in
period 1 that he does not give any information on the state in period 2). Therefore, when the
regulator knows the values of a, B, and C, he can simply choose to pass information if and only
if Eq.(26) does not hold.
However, it is possible that some of the parameters are not known to the regulator in some
practical settings. For example, the benets from developing the forest may be better known to
the loggers than to the regulator. Therefore, it is useful to consider a situation in which a, B, and
C are known only to the two players, and the regulator has only some vague ideas about their
values. We demonstrate in the next section that, even in such a situation, the regulator may be
able to induce an ecient equilibrium by giving information to the players asymmetrically.
3. Case (III): Optimal regulation under strategic interactions and informational
constraints
Thus far, the players have been treated completely symmetrically (i.e., players  and  have
been treated in the same way). However, under certain assumptions stated below, it is socially
desirable to give perfect information to one of the players and less-than-perfect information
(noisy message about the true state) to the other player. Without loss of generality, we let the
former player be player  and the latter player .
With perfect information, player  chooses to develop if and only if the social planner in
Case (I) would choose to develop. Put dierently, player  makes the right decision about
development. At the same time, the incentive for player  to wait until period 2 is smaller
in this case than in Case (II), where there is a prospect of future information. Therefore, the
prisoner's dilemma situation due to the prospect of future information described in the previous
section can be avoided.
Sending information in this way would raise the following question: Why does one of the
players have to learn the true state? The answer is that if neither player knows the true state,
there is always a small probability that an inecient outcome is supported as an equilibrium.
Therefore, we need at least one player to know the true state.
We hereafter focus on cases in which sending information asymmetrically can help improve
eciency. Therefore, in this section, we make the following assumptions: (A-i) k < 1=2, (A-ii)
B < 2a=(1  2k), and (A-iii) a, B, and C are known to the players but not to the regulator.
Assumption (A-i) is required to have a situation in which information-induced ineciency
occurs. Assumption (A-ii) is also necessary. When B is very large relative to other parameters,
the regulator cannot keep the players from choosing to conserve in period 1 because the cost of
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the leader disadvantage is simply too large. Therefore, we need an upper bound onB. We include
Assumption (A-iii) to make the possibility of sending information asymmetrically meaningful.
This assumption is not essential and can be dropped without any major modications. However,
if the values of a, B, and C are also known to the regulator, the regulator can achieve an ecient
outcome by sending the information to neither or both players. Hence, the regulator does not
gain anything from the possibility of sending information asymmetrically.
We can now formalize the idea described above. Suppose that the regulator informs player
 of the true state in period 2 before an action is taken. Player , on the other hand, receives a
message m 2 M from the regulator, where M is the message space. In period 2, player  can
take a message-contingent action and player  a state-contingent action, if they have chosen to
conserve in period 1. This structure is common knowledge.
There are ve possible strategies for player : (a) d = (0; 0), (b) d = (0; 1), (c) d =
(0; Ind(s = s1)), (d) d
 = (0; Ind(s = s2)), and (e) d
 = (1; 1). Because strategy (c) dominates
strategies (b), (d) and (e), the only strategies that can possibly be chosen in an equilibrium are
(a) and (c). As a result, the regulator does not need more than two messages because there are
at most two Nash equilibria in general except for some corner cases that have measure zero on
the B   C plane. Therefore, we can let M = fm1;m2g without loss of generality.
We assume that the message sent to player  has the following structure: the regulator can
choose the probability of sending a message conditional on the state. That is, the regulator can
choose q1 and q2, where Pr(m = m1js1) = q1 and Pr(m = m1js2) = q2 before the players choose
their actions in period 1. We assume that the players know q1 and q2. Because player  always
receives a m1 or m2, we also have Pr(m = m2js1) = 1   q1 and Pr(m = m2js2) = 1   q2. As
with player , there are ve possible strategies for , though player  can only take a message-
contingent action instead of a state-contingent action. Unlike the case of player , none of these
ve strategies are trivially dominated by others.
With a slight abuse of notation, we can dene the best response functions for players  and
 in period 2 in a way similar to that presented previously:
gBR2 (d2 (s); d1;m) 2 arg max
d2 (m)2A2 (d1 )
Es
h
v2 ((d1; (d

2 (m); d

2 (s))); s)jm
i
(27)
gBR2 (d2 (m); d1; s) 2 arg max
d2 (s)2A2 (d1 )
Em
h
v2 ((d1; (d

2 (m); d

2 (s))); s)js
i
(28)
Now, given s 2 fs1; s2g and m 2 fm1;m2g, we can dene the equilibrium action prole in
period 2 as follows:
~d2(d1; (s;m)) = ( ~d

2 (m; d1);
~d2 (s; d1)) (29)
=
gBR2 ( ~d(s; d1); d1;m);gBR2 ( ~d2 (m; d1); d1; s) : (30)
By going back to period 1, we can dene the best response in period 1 in the following
manner:
gBRi1(d i1 ) 2 arg max
di12Ai1
vi1(d

1 ; d

1 ) +E(s;m)
h
vi2(d1;
~d2(d1; (s;m)); s)]
i
for i 2 f; g (31)
Given this, the equilibrium action prole in period 1 is characterized by the following:
~d1 = ( ~d

1 ;
~d1 ) = (
gBR1 ( ~d1 );gBR1 ( ~d1 )): (32)
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Using this, the sequence of equilibrium prole can be written as ~d(s;m)  ( ~d1; ~d2( ~d1; (s;m))).
Based on this, we can dene as follows the expected value of information for the society
when the regulator gives information asymmetrically:
]EV IS  ~WIII  W II ; (33)
where ~WIII  E(s;m)
h
v1 (
~d1) + v

1 (
~d1) + v

2 (
~d(s;m); s) + v2 (
~d(s;m); s)
i
is the expected total
payo when the information is asymmetrically sent.
Let us now create the ex ante expected payo matrix similar to Tables 3 and 4. To show how
this is done, let us consider cell ~d) in Table 5. Suppose that player  always chooses to develop
in both periods and that player  chooses to conserve in period 1 and develop in period 2 if
and only if m = m1. When (s;m) = (s1;m1), the sum of payos over the two periods for the
two players is ((1   k)b; a + kb), and this occurs with probability q1. Similarly, the sum of
payos for the two players is ( (1 k)c; a kc), (0; a+ b), and (0; a  c) when (s;m) is (s2;m1),
(s1;m2), and (s2;m2), respectively. These occur with probabilities q2(1   ), (1   q1), and
(1  )(1  q2), respectively. Therefore, the expected payo in this example is:
q1((1  k)b; a+ kb) + q2(1  )( (1  k)c; a  kc) (34)
+(1  q1)(0; a+ b) + (1  )(1  q2)(0; a  c)
= ((1  k)(Bq1   Cq2)); (a+ (kq1 + (1  q1))B   (kq2 + (1  q2))C)) : (35)
Carrying out similar computations for other strategy proles, we have Table 5. As with the
previous tables, the bold rules dene the subgames. Thus, we can solve the game using backward
induction as with Case (II).
The regulator can choose q1 and q2 appropriately so that an ecient outcome is supported as
an equilibrium. It turns out that an ecient outcome can be always supported as an equilibrium
under Assumptions (A-i) and (A-ii) regardless of the values of a, b, and c:
Proposition 2 . Suppose that Assumptions (A-i) and (A-ii) hold. Then, except for some
corner cases with measure zero on the B  C plane, a necessary and sucient condition for the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to be ecient (i.e., W^I = ~WIII) is (q1; q2) = (2k; 0).
Proof. Let us rst discuss the necessary condition. Notice rst that W^I = B when C  a.
Therefore, we must have ~WIII = B for C  a. This can only occur when the equilibrium is
either in cell ~a), or in cell ~c) when q2 = 0 in Table 5. However, ~a) cannot be an equilibrium if,
for example, B=2 > C  a, because d2 (m) = 1 dominates d2 (m) = 0 for player  in this case.
Therefore, q2 = 0 is necessary.
Notice that max
n
0; (1 q1)B2   (1  q2)C; B2   C; a+ kB   C
o
= a + kB   C for B  2a1 2k .
Therefore, for ~c) to be an equilibrium if and only if C  a, we want to have the following:
q1B
2
 a+ kB   C () C  a (36)
The above condition holds if and only if q1 = 2k.
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For the suciency, we have provided a complete description of the equilibrium for various
combinations of a, B, and C when (q1; q2) = (2k; 0) in Table A.9 and in Figure A.4 of the Ap-
pendix. This description also shows that ~WIII = W^I when (q1; q2) = (2k; 0) under assumptions
(A-i) and (A-ii). 
Notice that there still remain some combinations of a, B, and C (1 , 2 , 4 , and 5 in
Figure A.4 of the Appendix) that lead to inecient outcome. This is expected because the cost
of the leader disadvantage is high when B is high, and this cannot be changed by manipulating
the message. However, the gure also shows that Assumption (A-ii) can be slightly relaxed. We
can replace it by Assumption (A-ii') B < 2maxfa;Cg=(1  2k).
The results reported in Table A.9 of the Appendix show that sending information with
(q1; q2) = (2k; 0) is good even when Assumption (A-ii') may not be satised, because ]EV IS
is always non-negative. Therefore, even if the regulator has no knowledge about a, b, and c,
the regulator can still potentially improve the eciency by sending information asymmetrically.
Proposition 2 and this point underscore the importance of careful dissemination of information
to achieve an ecient outcome.
4. Discussion
In this study, we have introduced strategic interactions into the analysis of QOV. In so
doing, we have highlighted some conceptual diculties with the QOV when the regulator (or
the cost-benet analyst, for that matter) has to take strategic interactions as given.
We have shown that information may be harmful to the society as a whole because it may
induce a prisoner's dilemma situation. For example, when there is a follower advantage in
development, there are always some incentives for players to conserve in period 1 even when it
is inecient to develop in period 1. By giving perfect information about the true state to player
 and a noisy message to player , we can exploit the value of information to the society in
the rst-best case (i.e., EVII) while avoiding the ineciency induced by strategic interactions.
Proposition 2 provides the conditions for this to occur.
Notice that two conditions needs to be satised for eciency. First, if it is ecient for
the society to develop in period 1, then development should take place in period 1. Second, if
conservation is chosen in period 1 in the society, then development should take place in period 2
if and only if the state is s1.
Provided that Assumptions (A-i) and (A-ii') hold, the suciency of the second condition is
satised, because development is always chosen by player  in period 2 when the state is s1.
For the necessity part, it is clear that player  chooses to develop only if the state is s1. Noting
that the message m1 is never sent when the state is s2, we see that player  chooses to develop
only if the state s1. Therefore, the second condition is satised.
The rst condition is also satised by giving a noisy message to player . Because player 
receives only less-than-perfect information about the state in period 2, the expected gains from
delaying development is smaller for player . As a result, conservation is not as attractive to
player  as it is to player  in period 1. Hence, we can induce player  to choose to develop in
period 1 when it is ecient for the society to do so.
Because the primary goals of this paper is to highlight some conceptual diculties of the
QOV and to demonstrate the potential importance of information-induced ineciency, we tried
to keep the model as parsimonious as possible. However, it is useful to discuss qualitatively
what happens if our model allows for the possibility of state-dependent.
We consider an alternative setup, in which k < 1=2 if the state is s1 and k = 1=2 if the state
is s2, because it is one of the most interesting cases. In this case, as with Case (III), the follower
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advantage is still present. However, the cost is equally shared when the two players choose to
develop.
This setup could be interpreted in the context of climate change. Suppose that each player
represents a country (e.g., the US and China). We can regard dit = 0 as \stringent environmental
policy," and dit = 1 as \business as usual." When s = s1, a technology to cheaply eliminate
the damages from climate change (by, say, removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere) is
found. Because the follower country may be able to adopt such a technology faster and more
eectively than the other country, there may be a follower advantage (i.e., k < 1=2) when the
state is s1. On the other hand, when the state is s2, no such technology is found. In this case,
the damages from climate change would be felt equally by both countries so that k = 1=2. It
would be reasonable to assume that B is bounded and that B and C are not very well known
to the policy-makers of global climate policies.
Obviously, the example given represents a gross simplication of strategic interactions in the
arena of global climate policy. Our model nevertheless oers some insights into how information
should be handled in this context. In fact, the basic argument in Case (III) holds even in this
alternative setup; The leader disadvantage is exacerbated by the fact that the follower never
shares C with the leader with a prospect of perfect information, but the regulator can mitigate
this by giving a noisy message to one of the players. Therefore, although the state dependence
of k alters the incentive structures, the reason that giving a noisy message about the state helps
ensure an ecient equilibrium remains the same.
Applications of our model to important environmental problems would potentially require
careful calibration of parameters, extension of the number of players and the action space, and
perhaps incorporation of the possibility of dependent learning. Yet, given that many global
environmental problems feature irreversibility, strategic interactions and scientic uncertainty,
we believe that the possibility of information-induced ineciency is an area that deserves more
attention than it has received.
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Appendix A. Appendix
In this appendix, we provide a complete description of the QOV and EVI for Cases (I)
and (II) in Table A.6 and Figure A.1 for k = 1=2, in Table A.7 and Figure A.2 for k > 1=2, and
in Table A.8 and Figure A.3 for k < 1=2. Note that the conditions in Proposition 1 correspond
to 4 , 8 , and 12 in Table A.8 and Figure A.3.
We also provide in Table A.9 and Figure A.4 a complete description of the expected so-
cial welfare and EVI when the conditions in Proposition 2 are satised. In Assumption (A-ii)
corresponds to 7 , 8 , 9 , and 10 in Table A.9 and Figure A.4, whereas Assumption (A-ii')
corresponds to 3 and 6 in addition to these. The shaded areas in Figures A.2-A.4 repre-
sent inecient outcomes in the equilibrium (when information or message is provided by the
regulator).
For Tables A.6 through A.9, we describe the combinations of parameters a, B, and C on
the B   C plane in Figures A.1-A.4, respectively. For example, 5 in Figure A.1 refers to the
condition C > a+B when k = 1=2. Reading the corresponding row in Table A.6, we have:
QOVI = EVII = EVIS = B: (A.1)
In these tables, we also provide a complete description of the sequence of action prole in
the equilibrium. To describe the sequence, we refer to the payo matrices for Case (II) without
information in period 2 in Table 3, for Case (II) with information in Table 4, for Case (III) when
the condition in Proposition 2 is satised (i.e., (q1; q2) = (2k; 0)) in Table 5.
If there are multiple equilibria, the choice of the equilibrium potentially aects the com-
putation of EVIS . We have used brackets to indicate the inecient equilibria (3 and 7 in
Table A.2) that are not used for the computation of EVIS . There are other cases with multiple
equilibria that are equally ecient (3 , 4 , 5 , 7 , and 11 in Table A.3). In these cases, the
choice of the equilibrium does not aect the values of EVIS .
To show how the tables should be read, let us consider again5 in Table A.6 (or C > a+B).
The table indicates that d and d^(s) are a) and a^) respectively. Referring to Tables 3 and 4,
we see that d = ((0; 0); (0; 0)) and d^(s) = ((0; 0); (Ind(s = s1); Ind(s = s1))). Other cells should
be interpreted in a similar manner.
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Table A.7: EVI and QOV when k > 1=2. (See also Figure A.2.)
d d^(s) QOVI EVII EVIS
1 i) d^) C 0 0
2 i) d^ C C   a 0
3 i) d^), [a^)] C C   a C   a
4 i) a^) C C   a C   a
5 i) d^) B 0 0
6 i) d^) B C   a 0
7 i) d^), [a^)] B C   a C   a
8 i) a^) B C   a C   a
9 a) a^) B B B
Table A.8: EVI and QOV when k < 1=2. (See also Figure A.3.)
d d^(s) QOVI EVII EVIS
1 e) a^) C 0 C
2 e) a^) C C   a C
3 f); h) b^); c^) C 0 0
4 f); h) a^) C 0 C   a(< 0)
5 f); h) a^) C C   a C   a
6 i) d^) C 0 0
7 i) b^); c^) C 0 0
8 i) a^) C 0 C   a(< 0)
9 i) a^) C C   a C   a
10 i) d^) B 0 0
11 i) b^); c^) B 0 0
12 i) a^) B 0 C   a(< 0)
13 i) a^) B C   a C   a
14 a) a^) B B B
Table A.9: EVI and the expected total payo when the conditions in Proposition 2 are satised. (See also
Figure A.4.)
~d(s;m) ~WIII W

II
gEVIS W^I
1 ~g) B   C B   C 0 a+B   C
2 ~g) B   C B   C 0 B
3 ~c) B B   C C B
4 ~g) B   C a+B   C a a+B   C
5 ~g) B   C a+B   C a B
6 ~c) B a+B   C C   a(> 0) B
7 ~i) a+B   C a+B   C 0 a+B   C
8 ~h);~i) a+B   C a+B   C 0 a+B   C
9 ~j) a+B   C a+B   C 0 a+B   C
10 ~c) B 0 B B
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Figure A.1: Parameter combinations when k = 1=2.
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Figure A.2: Parameter combinations when k > 1=2.
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Figure A.3: Parameter combinations when k < 1=2.
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Figure A.4: Parameter combinations when the conditions in Proposition 2 are satised.
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